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 MEDIA AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION:  
A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 
 
EYTAN GILBOA* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Successive evolutions in communication technologies have significantly 
altered the conduct of conflict, warfare, and conflict resolution.  Compared to 
people of earlier ages, people around the world today know much more and 
much sooner about major developments in international relations.  Global 
news networks that broadcast live from all corners of the world and via the 
Internet provide immediate access to unfolding events and, under certain 
conditions, could influence the way those events develop and end.  Evolutions 
in communication technologies have changed the meaning of power in 
international relations, the number and nature of actors participating in 
international political processes, and the strategies these actors employ to 
achieve their goals.  Governments have lost much of their monopoly on 
information, and non-state actors and individuals have become much more 
active and significant participants in world affairs, both in warfare and 
conflict resolution.  State and non-state actors are increasingly employing 
―soft power,‖ or ―smart power,‖ which integrates soft and hard power, and 
public diplomacy, which translates soft power assets into concrete actions.
1
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1. Soft power is the capability to get actors to do what you want via attraction and persuasion, 
while hard power is the capability to achieve the same goals via military force and economic means, 
including sanctions, aid, and bribes.  JOSEPH S. NYE JR., SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN 
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Successful utilization of soft power and public diplomacy depends to a large 
extent on global communication. 
Despite the critical significance of the roles played by media in conflict 
and conflict resolution, this area has been relatively neglected by both 
scholars and practitioners.  Most existing studies focus on the often negative 
contributions of the media to the escalation and violence phases of conflict.
2
  
Very few studies deal with the actual or potential media contributions to 
conflict resolution and reconciliation.
3
  Indeed, the media, particularly radio 
and television, were instrumental in fomenting conflict and violence in places 
such as Rwanda and Bosnia.
4
  The Danish cartoon controversy also 
demonstrates that the media can even cause a violent conflict.
5
  Scholars and 
practitioners have noticed how the media exacerbate conflict and have 
concluded that the media’s role can be reversed and converted into positive 
contributions to conflict resolution.
6
  This reversal, however, is difficult to 
achieve.  It is always easier to foment conflict than resolve it, and the media’s 
role in conflict resolution is more complicated than the roles of those 
dominating the violence phase. 
The paucity of research and analysis of the media’s role in conflict 
resolution may be attributed to the difficulties inherent in multidisciplinary 
 
WORLD POLITICS, at x, 5–6 (2004); THE NEW PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: SOFT POWER IN INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS 33–35 (Jan Melissen ed., 2005); Ernest J. Wilson III, Hard Power, Soft Power, Smart 
Power, 616 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 110, 114–15 (2008).  See generally ALI FISHER & 
AURÉLIE BRÖCKERHOFF, OPTIONS FOR INFLUENCE: GLOBAL CAMPAIGNS OF PERSUASION IN THE 
NEW WORLDS OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY (2008); MARK LEONARD ET AL., PUBLIC DIPLOMACY (2002); 
Nicholas J. Cull, Public Diplomacy: Taxonomies and Histories, 616 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & 
SOC. SCI. 31 (2008); Eytan Gilboa, Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy, 616 ANNALS AM. 
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 55 (2008) (discussing the basic workings of public diplomacy). 
2. See, e.g., MICK HUME, WHOSE WAR IS IT ANYWAY? THE DANGERS OF THE JOURNALISM OF 
ATTACHMENT (1997).  
3. See, e.g., Eytan Gilboa, Media and Conflict Resolution, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF 
CONFLICT RESOLUTION 455–74 (Jacob Bercovitch, Victor Kremenyuk & I. William Zartman eds., 
2009) [hereinafter Gilboa, Media and Conflict Resolution]; Eytan Gilboa, Media and International 
Conflict, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT COMMUNICATION: INTEGRATING THEORY, 
RESEARCH, AND PRACTICE 595–620 (John G. Oetzel & Stella Ting-Toomey eds., 2006). 
4. See DINA TEMPLE-RASTON, JUSTICE ON THE GRASS: A STORY OF GENOCIDE AND 
REDEMPTION 1–11 (2005); Phyllis E. Bernard, Eliminationist Discourse in a Conflicted Society: 
Lessons for America from Africa?, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 173, 191–200 (2009); Ahmed Buric, The 
Media War and Peace in Bosnia, in REGIONAL MEDIA IN CONFLICT: CASE STUDIES IN LOCAL WAR 
REPORTING 64–99 (Alan Davis ed., 2001); Lynn M. Malley, Observations from an American Conflict 
Resolution Professional in Serbia on the Effects of the Accessibility of International Media, 93 
MARQ. L. REV. 241, 245 (2009). 
5. See generally Bent Nørby Bonde, How 12 Cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed Were 
Brought to Trigger an International Conflict, 28 NORDICOM REV. 33 (2007); Shawn Powers, 
Examining the Danish Cartoon Affair: Mediatized Cross-Cultural Tensions?, 1 MEDIA, WAR & 
CONFLICT 339–59 (2008). 
6. See Gilboa, Media and Conflict Resolution, supra note 3, at 461–66.  
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research and the absence of adequate tools, models, and frameworks for 
analysis.  There are serious gaps between theoreticians and practitioners in the 
fields of conflict resolution, communication, and journalism.  Gaps also exist 
between theoreticians and practitioners within each of these groups.  One way 
to reduce these gaps is to construct a multidisciplinary framework for analysis 
and practice.  This study attempts to offer such a framework. 
This work is based on a unique multidisciplinary integration of normative 
and empirical theories and approaches from several fields: international 
relations, conflict studies, communication, and journalism.  While the field of 
international relations places contemporary conflict in a proper historical and 
theoretical context, the discipline of conflict studies provides concepts and 
analysis of information related to the nature and process of conflict resolution 
and reconciliation.  Communication studies give meaning to the evolutions in 
communication technologies and media functions.  Finally, the field of 
journalism provides insight into the roles of journalists in society and conflict 
resolution. 
This Article is divided into five parts.  Part II explores contemporary 
international conflicts and suggests significant distinctions between levels, 
types, and phases of conflict.  Part III suggests distinctions between types of 
media, types of journalism, levels of media, and media functions and 
dysfunctions.  Part IV integrates the different components into one 
multidimensional and multidisciplinary framework for analysis and suggests 
how it may be utilized for both theory and practice.  Part V concludes. 
II.  CONFLICT 
A.  Levels 
Contemporary violent conflicts tend to occur within, rather than between, 
states.
7
  Even during the Cold War, protracted limited violence—exemplified 
primarily in terrorism and guerilla warfare, as opposed to large-scale 
conventional war—dominated international relations.8  Figure 1 shows that at 
the beginning of the Cold War, the number of internal violent conflicts was 
higher than the number of interstate conflicts, but that the gap between the 
two types was small.  Since the mid-1950s, the gap has considerably widened.  
Following the end of the Cold War, the number of violent internal conflicts 
went up sharply and new conflicts emerged at the global level. 
 
7. See MARTIN VAN CREVELD, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WAR 20–21, 25, 192 (1991).  
―Interstate conflicts‖ occur between and among sovereign states while ―internal conflicts‖ occur 
between and among groups or organizations within a state, such as ethnic and religious groups.  
―Low intensity conflicts‖ occur between and among states, but also between and among groups or 
organizations within states. 
8. MICHAEL S. NEIBERG, WARFARE IN WORLD HISTORY 93–97 (2001). 
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Figure 1: Global Trends in Violent Conflict, 1950–20059 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ethnic and civil wars erupted in Yugoslavia, the former Soviet Union, and 
Africa, in places such as Rwanda, Congo, Somalia, Sudan, Kenya, and 
Liberia.  Further, the September 11 terrorist attacks on New York and 
Washington by Islamic fundamentalists, and similar subsequent attacks in 
Great Britain, Spain, Kenya, Indonesia, Bali, Turkey, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, 
and Egypt, as well as the United States-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
represent conflict at the global level.
10
  The ―clash of civilizations‖ theory 
debates the economic and social consequences of globalization and deals with 
conflict at the global level.
11
 
 
9. J. Joseph Hewitt, Trends in Global Conflict 1946–2005, in PEACE AND CONFLICT 2008, at 21 
(J. Joseph Hewitt, Jonathan Wilkenfeld & Ted Robert Gurr eds., 2008).    
10. See Global Terrorism Database, University of Maryland, National Consortium for the Study 
of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/ (providing 
information on more than 80,000 terrorist events around the world from 1970 through 2007) (last 
visited Nov. 19, 2009). 
11. See BENJAMIN R. BARBER, JIHAD VS. MCWORLD 23, 219 (1995); THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, 
THE WORLD IS FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 419–25 (2005); SAMUEL 
P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER 68 (1996); 
JOSEPH S. NYE JR., POWER IN THE GLOBAL INFORMATION AGE: FROM REALISM TO GLOBALIZATION 
194 (2004). 
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B.  Types 
The nature and evolution of contemporary conflicts have generated 
analytical distinctions between different kinds and levels of violence.  
Scholars distinguish High Intensity Conflict (HIC), where violence is 
primarily characterized by interstate wars,
12
 from Low Intensity Conflict 
(LIC), where violence is much more limited and is pursued by irregular forces 
against regular armies.
13
  Scholars have characterized the violence of LIC as a 
―small war‖14 or ―fourth-generation wars.‖15  In his book, Strategy: The Logic 
of War and Peace, Edward N. Luttwak coined a postmodern term— 
―post-heroic war‖—to describe the essence of LIC.16  These terms suggest 
that conflict and warfare today are very different from those of previous eras.  
In the 1990s, the U.S. Department of Defense defined LIC as: 
 
political-military confrontation between contending states or 
groups below conventional war and above the routine, 
peaceful competition among states.  It frequently involves 
protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies.  
Low-intensity conflict ranges from subversion to the use of 
armed forces.  It is waged by a combination of means, 
employing political, economic, informational, and military 
instruments.  Low-intensity conflicts are often localized, 
generally in the Third World, but contain regional and global 
security implications.
17
 
 
12. STEPHEN D. BIDDLE, MILITARY POWER: EXPLAINING VICTORY AND DEFEAT IN MODERN 
BATTLE 6 (2004). 
13. LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT: THE PATTERN OF WARFARE IN THE MODERN WORLD 2–5 
(Loren B. Thompson ed., 1989). 
14. Harry G. Summers Jr., A War is a War is a War is a War, in LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT, 
supra note 13, at 45–48.  
15. Thomas X. Hammes, Insurgency: Modern Warfare Evolves into a Fourth Generation, 214 
STRATEGIC FORUM 1, 1 (2005).  First-generation warfare started after the Treaty of Westphalia 
(1648), and refers to battles fought by states using line-and-column tactics with uniformed soldiers.  
William S. Lind, Understanding Fourth Generation War, 84 MIL. REV. 12, 12 (2004).   
Second-generation warfare began in the mid-1800s following the invention of new weapons, 
including breech-loading weapons, machine guns, and indirect artillery.  Id.  Third-generation 
warfare began with the German blitzkrieg, which introduced the elements of speed and surprise and 
was used to bypass enemy lines and collapse the enemy’s forces from the rear.  Id. at 13.  Fourth-
generation warfare is conflict characterized by battles between state and non-state actors and the 
blurring of the lines between war and politics, and soldier and civilian.  Id. at 13, 16. 
16. EDWARD N. LUTTWAK, STRATEGY: THE LOGIC OF WAR AND PEACE 68–80 (rev. & 
enlarged ed. 2001).     
17. Janine Davidson, Principles of Modern American Counterinsurgency: Evolution and 
Debate 1, 8 & n.18 (Brookings Inst., Counterinsurgency and Pakistan Paper Series No. 1, 2009), 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2009/0608_counterinsurgency_davidson/0608_ 
counterinsurgency_davidson.pdf (noting that the U.S. Department of Defense has since replaced this 
definition in its U.S. Army field manuals with definitions more focused on modern 
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LIC is usually asymmetrical, especially when one side is a state 
employing armed forces and obeying the laws and rules of war while the other 
side is an organization or a group employing irregular forces, exploiting the 
weaknesses of liberal democracies, and systematically violating the laws and 
rules of war.
18
  These characteristics suggest that the goals of parties engaged 
in LIC are more political than military.
19
  The main strategy is to wear out the 
other side, and the results on the ground are less important because victory is 
defined in terms of perceptual changes leading to acceptance of demands.
20
  
Usually, non-state actors select this mode of conflict because it best serves 
their causes.
21
  LIC is long, very difficult to resolve, and requires effective 
conflict management which, at most, may reduce the level of violence.  LIC 
persists with periods of ceasefire in between waves of violence.  The 
distinction between home and front, and soldiers and citizens, is blurred.
22
  
Often, in clear violation of international law and norms, a violent organization 
deliberately attacks members of the other side and uses its own members as 
human shields.
23
 
A conflict in a particular region may transform across time from one type 
of conflict to another.  For example, in 2003 the U.S. fought a  
full-scale war in Iraq, but since then the U.S. has been engaged in LIC.  The 
purpose of the first stage, HIC, was to remove the regime of Saddam Hussein.  
The main purpose of the second stage, LIC, was to replace Saddam Hussein’s 
authoritarian regime with democracy.  The second LIC stage consisted of two 
interrelated types of violence: a civil war between the Sunni, the previous 
minority ruling sect, and the Shia, the new ruling sect; and a war between 
several opposition forces, primarily the Sunni, and the U.S. forces.  The two 
types of warfare are very different and present different challenges for  
policy makers and the media. 
Given the different characteristics of the two types of conflict, their 
resolution requires different approaches.  Protracted violence of the kind that 
existed in the Balkans, Iraq, Sudan, and Israel and Palestine has been 
exacerbated by many complex historical, religious, and cultural elements.  
International and intrastate religious and cultural conflicts are much more 
difficult to resolve than territorial interstate conflicts.  In several recent cases, 
such as the Balkans, only foreign military intervention stopped the violence 
 
counterinsurgency tactics) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
18. See LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT, supra note 13, at 3–4. 
19. Id. at 4.   
20. See id. 
21. See id.  
22. Id.   
23. See, e.g., Nick Cumming-Bruce, U.N. Investigator Presents Report on Gaza War, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 29, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/30/world/middleeast/30gaza.html. 
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and created favorable conditions for effective conflict resolution.  Media 
coverage of LICs is extremely crucial because the main goal of the sides 
engaged in this type of conflict is to alter the enemy’s perception.24 
C.  Phases 
International conflict is a dynamic process that moves through several 
distinct phases or stages.  Scholars and practitioners have identified life cycles 
of conflicts and analyzed them in chronological terms.
25
  Many scholars and 
practitioners have distinguished three basic phases: pre-conflict, conflict, and 
post-conflict,
26
 or pre-violence, violence, and post-violence.
27
  These 
approaches are not very useful because they focus on ―conflict‖ or ―violence‖ 
and treat the other phases as merely insignificant stages that chronologically 
come before or after conflict or violence.  A more useful approach would 
consider the pre- and post- phases as equally important, and would attempt to 
fill them with adequate and relevant content.  This Article suggests 
distinguishing four stages of international conflict based on different critical 
conditions and principal intervention goals: (1) onset-prevention, (2) 
escalation-management, (3) de-escalation-resolution, and (4) termination-
reconciliation.  Each phase has distinct characteristics and specific outcomes. 
The first stage, onset-prevention, is characterized by the surfacing of 
conflict, the beginning of disagreements, and growth in hostile verbal and 
behavioral exchanges.  At this stage, only effective prevention measures can 
stop the conflict from deteriorating into violence.
28
  If prevention succeeds, 
the conflict is peacefully settled and the conflict process temporarily or 
permanently terminates.  If not, parties may escalate the conflict believing 
they can impose a solution via violence.  Uses of force include full-scale war, 
military intervention, terrorism, guerrilla warfare, firing across borders, and 
deployment of forces.  Conflict management—limiting and halting violence to 
relatively tolerable levels—applies to the escalation phase, which typically 
 
24. See Hammes, supra note 15, at 1–2. 
25. See, e.g., JOHAN GALTUNG, PEACE BY PEACEFUL MEANS: PEACE AND CONFLICT, 
DEVELOPMENT AND CIVILIZATION 81–87 (1996); JOHN PAUL LEDERACH, PREPARING FOR PEACE: 
CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION ACROSS CULTURES 12–15 (1995); JOHN PAUL LEDERACH, THE 
MORAL IMAGINATION: THE ART AND SOUL OF BUILDING PEACE 41–49 (2005) [hereinafter 
LEDERACH, MORAL IMAGINATION]; MICHAEL S. LUND, PREVENTING VIOLENT CONFLICTS: A 
STRATEGY FOR PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY 37–44 (1996).  
26. ROSS HOWARD, AN OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR MEDIA AND PEACEBUILDING 6–8 
(2002); Christoph Spurk, Media and Peacebuilding: Concepts, Actors and Challenges 7–10 (Ctr. for 
Peacebuilding (KOFF), Paper No. 1, 2002). 
27. Peter Viggo Jakobsen, Focus on the CNN Effect Misses the Point: The Real Media Impact 
on Conflict Management Is Invisible and Indirect, 37 J. PEACE RES. 131, 132 (2000).  
28. See Alice Ackermann, The Idea and Practice of Conflict Prevention, 40 J. PEACE RES. 339, 
341–42 (2003).   
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ends in a formal or informal ceasefire or an armistice. 
The post-conflict period should be further subdivided into two separate 
phases: (1) resolution and (2) reconciliation.  The difference between the two 
stems from the significant distinction sociologist Johan Galtung made 
between ―negative peace‖ and ―positive peace‖ in his pioneering article, 
Violence, Peace, and Peace Research.
29
  Negative peace refers only to the 
absence of violence,
30
 whereas positive peace refers to the building of new 
relations in many relevant areas between former enemies, including open 
borders, trade, tourism, and cultural ties.
31
  Positive peace is equivalent to 
what international relations scholar Kenneth Boulding called ―stable peace.‖32  
Stable peace is ―a situation in which the probability of war is so small that it 
does not really enter the calculations of any of the people involved.‖33  Other 
scholars have made a similar distinction between ―conflict resolution‖ and 
conflict ―transformation.‖34  According to scholar John P. Lederach, conflict 
transformation usually involves transforming perceptions of issues, actions, 
and other people or groups, and it takes place both at the personal and the 
systemic level.
35
 
In the resolution phase, leaders attempt to negotiate an agreement to end 
violence.  If leaders reach a formal agreement, they may end violence and 
facilitate transformation.  If leaders do not reach a formal agreement, they 
may resume violence or create a stalemate.  International relations scholars 
had believed that positive or stable peace could be achieved and maintained 
via security and economic and political cooperation.
36
  More recently, 
however, they have become aware of the need to also examine psychological 
dimensions of this phase.
37
 
The reconciliation phase goes beyond conflict resolution and peace 
agreements, and addresses psychological and cognitive barriers to stable 
 
29. Johan Galtung, Violence, Peace, and Peace Research, 6 J. PEACE RES. 167, 183 (1969).  
30. Id. at 189–90 n.31. 
31. See id.  
32. KENNETH BOULDING, STABLE PEACE 13 (1978). 
33. Id. 
34. JOHN PAUL LEDERACH, BUILDING PEACE: SUSTAINABLE RECONCILIATION IN DIVIDED 
SOCIETIES 24–25, 73–85 (1997) [hereinafter LEDERACH, BUILDING PEACE]; Hugh Miall, Conflict 
Transformation Theory and European Practice 3 (Sep. 12–15, 2007) (unpublished paper prepared for 
the Sixth Pan-European Conference on International Relations, ECPR Standing Group on 
International Relations, in Turin, Italy), available at  
http://archive.sgir.eu/uploads/Miall-conflict_transformation_theory_and_european_practice.pdf.  
35. LEDERACH, BUILDING PEACE, supra note 34, at 75.  
36. See generally STABLE PEACE AMONG NATIONS (Arie M. Kacowicz et al. eds., 2000). 
37. Fen Osler Hampson, Parent, Midwife, or Accidental Executioner? The Role of Third 
Parties in Ending Violent Conlict, in TURBULENT PEACE: THE CHALLENGES OF MANAGING 
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 388, 395–97 (Chester A. Crocker et al. eds., 2001).  
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peace.
38
  Reconciliation moves from formal peace agreements to ―changing 
the motivations, goals, beliefs, attitudes, and emotions of the great majority of 
the society members regarding the conflict, the nature of the relationship 
between the parties, and the parties themselves.‖39  Reconciliation is both a 
process and an outcome.
40
  The outcome is friendship and harmony between 
former enemies. 
The distinction between resolution and transformation of conflict
41
 is 
based on the assumption that even if the opposing sides reach a peace 
agreement, it is only an agreement between leaders, not between peoples, and 
it has to be fully implemented and respected over time.  Therefore, the 
distinction between the third phase, conflict resolution, and the fourth phase, 
reconciliation, is that during reconciliation the parties attempt to move from 
negative peace to positive peace, or from conflict resolution to conflict 
transformation.  The parties try to fully engage their respective peoples and 
transform relations from hostility to amicability.  Scholar Raimo Väyrynen 
raised questions about the meaning of transformation and placed the concept 
in a different context.
42
  For Väyrynen, transformation meant a major change 
in a principal element of a conflict that includes actors, issues, and rules, and 
therefore, it may occur at any phase.
43
  Väyrynen argued that transformation 
must happen before resolution becomes possible.
44
 
Given Väyrynen’s approach and the different meanings applied to 
transformation, other concepts have had to be identified and used in 
connection with positive peace.  The options are ―peacebuilding‖ and 
 
38. See Herbert C. Kelman, Reconciliation as Identity Change: A Social-Psychological 
Perspective, in FROM CONFLICT RESOLUTION TO RECONCILIATION 111–24 (Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov 
ed., 2004).  See generally AFTER THE PEACE: RESISTANCE AND RECONCILIATION (Robert L. 
Rothstein ed., 1999) [hereinafter AFTER THE PEACE]; FORGIVENESS AND RECONCILIATION: 
RELIGION, PUBLIC POLICY, AND CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION (Raymond G. Helmick & Rodney L. 
Petersen eds., 2001); ROADS TO RECONCILIATION: CONFLICT AND DIALOGUE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY (Amy Benson Brown & Karen M. Poremski eds., 2005). 
39. Daniel Bar-Tal & Gemma H. Bennink, The Nature of Reconciliation as an Outcome and as 
a Process, in FROM CONFLICT RESOLUTION TO RECONCILIATION, supra note 38, at 11, 12. 
40. See Alice Ackermann, Reconciliation as a Peace-Building Process in Postwar Europe: The 
Franco-German Case, 19 PEACE & CHANGE 229, 229–30 (1994) [hereinafter Ackermann, 
Reconciliation].  See also Herbert C. Kelman, Transforming the Relationship Between Former 
Enemies: A Social-Psychological Analysis, in AFTER THE PEACE, supra note 38, at 193–205; Graham 
Kemp, The Concept of Peaceful Societies, in KEEPING THE PEACE: CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND 
PEACEFUL SOCIETIES AROUND THE WORLD 1–10 (Graham Kemp & Douglas P. Fry eds., 2004). 
41. Several scholars have suggested that transformation of conflict is a ―process,‖ but have 
defined ―reconciliation‖ as an outcome.  Others, however, have viewed reconciliation as both a 
process and an outcome. 
42. Raimo Väyrynen, From Conflict Resolution to Conflict Transformation: A Critical Review, 
in THE NEW AGENDA FOR PEACE RESEARCH 135–160 (Ho-Won Jeong ed., 1999). 
43. Id. at 151.  
44. See id. at 150–51. 
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―reconciliation.‖45  Several scholars have equated the two,46 but others have 
used peacebuilding as a general concept that applies to all the phases  
and levels of conflict.
47
  This work suggests that the term  
―termination-reconciliation‖ best captures the essence of the fourth phase. 
 
Figure 2: Phases of Conflict 
 
 
Stage/Phase 
 
 
Pre-Conflict 
 
Conflict 
 
Post-Conflict 
 
Revised 
Stage/ 
Phase 
 
Onset 
 
 
Escalation 
 
De-escalation 
 
Termination 
 
Prevention 
 
Management 
 
Resolution 
 
Reconciliation 
 
Outcome 
 
 
   Violence           Ceasefire            Negative             Positive  
                               Peace                  Peace                 Peace  
 
Figure 2 describes the four suggested phases of conflict by stage/phase, 
revised stage/phase, and outcome.  Each phase may end in outcomes different 
from those listed in Figure 2.  For example, if prevention succeeds, the 
conflict does not become violent; if conflict resolution fails, the parties cannot 
sign a peace agreement.  The listed outcomes typically occur when a conflict 
moves from one phase to the next, but an international conflict may not move 
linearly from one phase to another.  A conflict may erratically move forward 
and backward, for example, from management to resolution and back to 
management.  Phases of international conflict are often fluid.  Events and 
processes, such as uses of force, negotiation, and mediation, may appear at 
 
45. See, e.g, ROLAND PARIS, AT WAR’S END: BUILDING PEACE AFTER CIVIL CONFLICT 38 
(2004); Ho-Won Jeong, Peacebuilding: Conceptual and Policy Issues, in APPROACHES TO 
PEACEBUILDING 3–5 (Ho-Won Jeong ed., 2002); Ackermann, Reconciliation, supra note 40, at 230. 
46. Compare Ackermann, Reconciliation, supra note 40, at 230 (defining reconciliation as ―a 
process by which countries can establish structures and procedures for establishing durable peace‖) 
with PARIS, supra note 45, at 38 (defining peacebuilding as ―action undertaken at the end of a civil 
conflict to consolidate peace‖).   
47. See Spurk, supra note 26, at 1; LEDERACH, MORAL IMAGINATION, supra note 25, at 5; 
HOWARD, supra note 26, at 5.  
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more than one phase.  Even when parties seek resolution through negotiation, 
they may still use force to improve their bargaining power.  Failure to reach 
an agreement may motivate parties to renew hostilities.  Thus, force may be 
used in both the management and resolution phases.  While the purpose of 
using force in the management phase is to impose a solution, the purpose of 
using force in the resolution phase is to affect negotiations.  Uses of force in 
the two phases also differ; force is more massive and sustained in the 
management phase, but more sporadic and limited in the resolution phase. 
Similarly, negotiation and mediation occur during both prevention and 
resolution.  In the prevention phase, the purpose of negotiation is to peacefully 
deal with the sources of conflict to prevent violence, while in the resolution 
phase, the purpose is to negotiate a peace agreement following the eruption of 
violence.  Conflict resolution after war can be both easier and more 
complicated.  Conflict resolution can be easier because parties may be ready 
to make concessions that they rejected prior to the violent phase.  However, 
conflict resolution can be more complicated because neither side can move 
beyond its negative feelings over its incurred cost of violence in terms of 
human and material resources. 
III.  MEDIA 
A.  Type I: Traditional vs. New Media 
Any analysis of media roles in conflict resolution must address both the 
traditional media (newspapers, television, and radio) and the new media 
(Internet).  Evolutions in communication technologies have created global 
news networks and various online social networks.
48
  Global news networks 
can broadcast live from almost any place in the world to any other place.  
Commentators and scholars invented the term ―CNN effect‖ to describe how 
dominant global television coverage has become in world affairs, especially in 
acute international conflicts.
49
  The term implies that television coverage 
forces policy makers to take actions they otherwise would not have taken.
50
  
Thus, the media determine the national interest and usurp policy making from 
elected and appointed officials.
51
 
The Internet provides many non-state actors with access to people around 
the world and, consequently, with endless opportunities to exchange and 
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debate events and processes both inside and outside political entities.
52
  Non-
state actors include non-governmental organizations, international agencies, 
alliances, multinational firms, terrorist organizations, criminal organizations, 
global news networks, and even individuals.  The Internet provides people 
with access to news from a variety of sources, up-to-the-minute information 
on events and processes, and different points of view.
53
  It also allows 
unprecedented interactivity, from simple talk back to blogs and placement of 
text, picture, and video on rapidly growing social networks such as Twitter, 
YouTube, Facebook, and MySpace.
54
 
Moreover, cell phones allow people to send e-mails, receive information, 
and produce photographs and videos.  The combination of advanced cell 
phones and social networking inspires the emergence of ―citizen journalists‖ 
who can at any time report events from houses and streets to the entire 
world.
55
  The Internet can penetrate national boundaries of even the most 
closed and authoritarian societies. 
For instance, the 2009 protest against the outcome of the presidential 
elections in Iran demonstrated the new options for communication and 
influence available on the Internet.  The Iranian government attempted to 
block coverage of the large demonstrations in Tehran and other major cities 
by imposing harsh restrictions on local and foreign reporters, but the 
opposition was able to send reports of the violence inflicted on the 
demonstrators via social networks such as YouTube and Twitter.
56
 
Unlike the conventional media, the Internet is almost unlimited in space, 
is a very fast mode of communication, allows sophisticated utilization of 
multimedia functions and interactivity, reaches large audiences around the 
world, is not subject to stiff regulation and control, and is relatively 
inexpensive to maintain.  In addition, web sites and social networks have 
become sources of information for the traditional media as well as for global 
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news networks.
57
  Live reporting is no longer the exclusive domain of 
networks such as CNN and BBC World News.  At the same time, however, it 
is very difficult to verify the authenticity and accuracy of Internet reports, 
including visual materials.
58
  Audiences may not know who, when, where, and 
under what circumstances a particular photo or video clip was taken.  Without 
regulation, ethical standards, or professional supervision, any individual 
posting materials can fabricate events or rewrite them.  This is particularly 
true for conflicts in which each side presents its own narrative and grievances. 
The Internet provides many advantages to state and non-state actors, 
particularly weak and poor actors.  Through web sites, states, groups, 
movements, organizations, and individuals can directly present themselves 
and their positions to the world, and can cultivate hundreds of supporting 
virtual communities to help spread their messages.  Like a weapon, the 
Internet also can be used to attack and discredit hostile forces.  Through the 
Internet, actors can respond immediately to unfolding events, address 
challenges, and exploit advantages.
59
  Actors that do not employ the Internet 
rob themselves of a highly useful tool for engaging in foreign policy and 
diplomacy. 
B.  Type II: Conflict vs. Peace Journalism 
Media coverage of international conflict has inspired heated normative 
and ethical debates on types of journalism.  The most well-known are debates 
about ―bystander journalism‖ versus ―journalism of attachment,‖ and 
―war/conflict journalism‖ versus ―peace journalism.‖  Martin Bell, in his 
work, TV News: How Far Should We Go?, criticized conflict coverage by 
distinguishing between ―bystanders’ journalism‖ and ―journalism of 
attachment.‖60  He criticized media neutrality and explained that bystanders’ 
journalism concerns itself more with the circumstances of violence such as 
military formations, weapons, strategies, maneuvers, and tactics, while 
journalism of attachment concerns itself more with people—those who 
provoke wars, those who fight them, and those who suffer from them.
61
  Bell 
argued that journalism of attachment ―cares as well as knows; . . . is aware of 
its responsibilities; and will not stand neutral between good and evil, right and 
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wrong, the victim and the oppressor.‖62  Bell’s colleagues in Bosnia, 
Christiane Amanpour and Ed Vulliamy, adopted a similar approach.
63
  
Amanpour argued that journalists can be objective by giving all sides a fair 
hearing, but they do not have to be neutral and treat all sides equally.
64
 
In the Balkan Wars, however, Amanpour and Vulliamy supported the 
Muslims and vehemently advocated military intervention against the Serbs.
65
  
A similar pattern surfaced in other conflicts, such as the Palestinian–Israeli 
conflict, in which Western journalists perceived the Palestinians as victims 
and sided with them.
66
  News organizations, editors, and reporters often 
ignore the media campaigns on behalf of a particular side in an international 
conflict because such campaigns violate standards of fair, balanced, and 
objective coverage.  The Bosnia coverage, however, inspired a needed debate 
on journalism of attachment among journalists and scholars.
67
  For instance, 
David Binder of the New York Times called Bell’s argument against neutrality 
in warfare ―a garbage argument,‖ and insisted that ―[o]ur job is to report from 
all sides, not to play favorites.‖68  Further, Mick Hume argued that journalism 
of attachment threatens good journalism because it neglects historical and 
political contexts of violence and causes journalists to set themselves up as 
judge and jury.
69
  Stephen Ward thought that Bell’s concept of objectivity was 
too narrow and dangerous because journalists may ―devolve into 
unsubstantiated journalism where biases parade as moral principles.‖70 
BBC World News anchorman Nick Gowing added that the attitude of 
Amanpour and her colleagues was neatly exploited by Bosnian ministers who 
―usually enjoyed a free ride, their increasingly exaggerated claims accepted as 
fact by callow interviewers and anchors in distant studios who did not have 
the knowledge or background briefings to know better.‖71  Likewise, Wilhelm 
Kempf concluded that journalism of attachment replaced the rules of 
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journalism with the rules of propaganda, and that in Bosnia journalists served 
their moral impetus by controlling information and fabricating news.
72
 
Further, journalism of attachment is problematic because it deals 
predominantly with Western coverage and ignores other types of media, such 
as the local media.
73
  The division of people into categories of ―aggressor‖ or 
―victim‖ is highly simplistic because it ignores the possibility that people 
ruled by aggressive leaders could also be victims; victims are not only those 
being attacked.
74
  Galtung implied that Bell’s journalism of attachment is not 
a good alternative to war journalism because it ignores the wider dimensions 
of conflict.
75
 
Galtung and Kempf offered alternatives to war journalism.  Galtung 
argued that the media generally follow the ―low road‖ of war journalism in 
reporting conflict: chasing wars, the elites that run wars, and a ―win-lose‖ 
outcome.
76
  His alternative approach, the ―high road‖ of peace journalism, 
focuses on conflict transformation, the people who suffer from violence, and a 
―win-win‖ solution.77  According to Galtung, war journalism focuses on who 
advances and who capitulates, keeping score of the cost in human lives and 
material damage.
78
  This type of coverage polarizes people and escalates 
conflict because it calls for hatred and more violence to avenge or stop 
―them.‖79  It sees ―them‖ as the problem and dehumanizes ―them.‖80  War 
journalism is driven by propaganda and manipulation and is therefore biased 
and distorted.
81
  In contrast, Galtung wrote, peace journalism explores the 
reasons behind the violence and provides not only a voice to all parties, but 
also empathy and understanding.
82
  Peace journalism focuses on all suffering 
and humanizes all sides.
83
  Peace journalism is more truthful and attempts to 
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de-escalate violence by highlighting peace and conflict resolution as much as 
violence.
84
  While war journalism attaches only to ―our side,‖ peace 
journalism is a journalism of attachment to all actual and potential victims.
85
 
Kempf built his approach on Galtung’s ideas, but suggested a more 
critical peace journalism, which he called ―de-escalation-oriented conflict 
coverage‖ (DEOCC).86  Kempf’s approach questions war and military logic, 
and respects and fairly covers the opponent’s rights.87 At the same time, 
however, a journalist engaging in DEOCC has to be cautious and self-critical 
to avoid dissemination of ―peace propaganda,‖ which is as counterproductive 
as ―war propaganda.‖88  DEOCC journalists must maintain a critical distance 
from the belligerents and equally and forcefully criticize their actions.
89
 
Several scholars and journalists have criticized peace journalism.  Thomas 
Hanitzsch, for example, criticized peace journalism and related approaches for 
being at odds with mass communication theory.
90
  Peace journalism is based 
on the assumption of ―powerful, causal and linear media effects.‖91  
Communication theory, however, has produced very little empirical support 
for this approach.
92
  Peace journalism looks at the audience as an aggregate of 
dispersed individuals, but communication theory has identified multiple 
audiences with different characteristics.
93
  Peace journalism assumes that 
publishers and journalists, especially at the local media level, can disregard 
the interests of their specific audiences; but communication theory suggests 
that this assumption is unnatural and economically impossible.
94
  Peace 
journalism places responsibility on the media to prevent, manage, resolve, and 
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transform conflicts, but communication theory does not recognize this role, 
and sociological system theory places responsibility for these functions on 
political institutions and leaders.
95
 
C.  Levels 
When analyzing the media’s role in conflict resolution, it is necessary to 
distinguish different types and levels of media.  Many studies address only the 
Western media.  However, media is global and can reach audiences 
worldwide without national, ethnic, or cultural bias.  The hybrid ―glocal‖ 
refers to media that deal with local or national issues, but are capable of 
reaching audiences around the world, such as through the Internet.
96
  A more 
useful approach would distinguish five levels of media by geopolitical 
criteria: (1) local, (2) national, (3) regional, (4) international, and (5) global. 
Local media include newspapers, television, and radio stations operating 
in a town, city, or district.  National media include newspapers and electronic 
media operating within the boundaries of nation-states.  Regional media 
operate in a region defined by history, culture, tradition, values, language, or 
religion.  Examples of regional media include Qatar-based Al Jazeera Arabic 
and Dubai-based Al Arabiya, which broadcast primarily to the Middle East, 
and the South African Broadcasting Corporation, which serves Africa.  
International media include broadcast and print media used or sponsored by 
states that operate across international borders.  Examples include the Voice 
of America, BBC World News, China’s CCTV-9, Al Jazeera International, 
France 24, Russia’s Vesti-TV, and Iran’s Press TV.  The global media include 
privately owned commercial television networks such as CNN International 
and print media such as the International Herald Tribune and the Economist. 
Both the international and the global media reach audiences worldwide, 
but the international media present news and commentary from the 
perspective of a particular state, while the global media have no such official 
allegiance.  In fact, several states such as China, Russia, France, and Iran 
established international news networks in English because they were 
dissatisfied with coverage of more established global networks such as CNN 
International and BBC World News, and have accused those networks of 
having a Western bias.
97
 
The global media have more worldwide bureaus and reporters than the 
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international media and cover a much wider variety of global issues, while the 
international media tend to cover issues directly relevant to the states which 
own them.  It is also interesting to note that both CNN and BBC operate two 
separate broadcasting systems; CNN International is a global network, while 
CNN-US is national, and BBC World News is a global network, while BBC-
UK is national.  The global networks do not broadcast respectively in the U.S. 
and the U.K. 
There are significant differences in approach and content between each 
network’s national, international, and global broadcasts, but very little 
research has been conducted to explore how wide the differences are and what 
their implications are.  Al Jazeera is a unique case because it was established 
and is subsidized by the Emir of Qatar.  It would be interesting to compare  
Al Jazeera’s Arabic broadcasts on the regional channel with its English 
broadcasts on the international level.
98
  It is extremely important to distinguish 
between the local and the national media in conflict regions and external 
media that operate outside these regions because the local and national media 
have a much greater impact on conflict resolution. 
D.  Functions and Dysfunctions 
The functional theory of communication could be very useful for any 
attempt to construct a new framework for analysis of media and conflict 
resolution.  Functional theory is a classic communication theory anchored in 
sociological system theory, which views institutions, including the media, as 
performing roles designed to meet the needs of individuals and societies.
99
  In 
communication studies, functional theory paved the way for several 
approaches and techniques in modern communication research, including 
media effects, uses and gratifications, agenda-setting, framing, cultivation 
theory, and the spiral of silence theory.
100
  Scholars have even described 
functional theory as a paradigm—a master theory in control of most research 
in mass communication.
101
 
Application of functional theory to mass communication developed over 
time through several stages.  Harold D. Lasswell first suggested three media 
functions: (1) surveillance of the environment (news coverage); (2) 
correlation of the parts of society (interpretation of news and information, 
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commentary, and editorial opinion); and (3) transmission of culture (history, 
values, religion, language, etc.).
102
  Charles R. Wright added a fourth function, 
entertainment, distinguished between functions and dysfunctions, and 
constructed a framework for functional analysis.
103
  Denis McQuail added a 
fifth function, mobilization, described as ―campaigning for societal objectives 
in the sphere of politics, war, economic development, work and sometimes 
religion.‖104  Mobilization exists in autocratic societies all the time, in new 
nations during the nation-building phase, and in democracies in times of crisis 
and warfare.  Mobilization may result from a governmental initiative or from 
the media’s own initiative.105  After the September 11 terrorist attacks, for 
example, the American media self-mobilized and became a significant 
collaborating actor in the global war against terrorism.
106
  Members of the 
media who engage in this type of mobilization are also known as the 
―[p]atriotic [p]ress.‖107 
Wright’s distinction between functions and dysfunctions is pertinent to 
this Article.
108
  Most approaches to media intervention in international conflict 
have ignored unintended consequences, both positive and negative.  The 
media may provide useful information to citizens who could be motivated to 
act against their own interests and the interests of their community.  For 
example, when the media warn of an approaching tornado, the purpose is not 
only to provide information, but also to help citizens prepare for threats to life 
and property.  A warning, however, could be dysfunctional if it causes panic 
and chaos or if everyone rushes to the roads and causes traffic jams.  
Similarly, the purpose of reporting on a bank’s financial difficulties is 
positive—warning those who have accounts of an imminent threat to their 
investments—but the result could be dysfunctional if all customers went to 
the bank, liquidated their assets, and drove the bank into bankruptcy. 
Application of the Wright formula suggests that, even if the media are 
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sincerely interested in positive contribution to prevent, manage, resolve, or 
reconcile international conflict, the results may backfire.  For example, during 
the prevention phase, the media may wish to create awareness among the 
public for signs of an emerging conflict or violence.  The result could be 
positive if the warning creates awareness and effective steps are taken to stop 
the drift toward violence.  However, the result could be negative if the 
coverage produces apprehension that leads to escalated conflict behavior.  It is 
important to educate the public about the sources of conflict and the potential 
for violence or conflict resolution.  If the public is educated, the coverage 
could be functional, but if the public is not educated, the coverage could be 
dysfunctional.  During the resolution phase, the media may wish to initiate a 
conflict resolution process and mobilize public support.  If mobilization 
occurs, the coverage could be functional.  However, if coverage creates 
stronger opposition and leads to blocking of the initiative, the result could be 
counterproductive and dysfunctional.  Similar dysfunctions could occur if the 
media attempts to legitimize conflict prevention or conflict resolution, build 
confidence, dramatize efforts to reduce violence and begin mediation, create 
realistic expectations, or present a positive balance of advantages and 
shortcomings of peace agreements. 
Several functions and dysfunctions may appear at each of the four conflict 
phases, while others may be unique to each phase.  In addition, functions and 
dysfunctions may vary for each of the five basic media functions.  For 
instance, entertainment may include implicit or explicit messages that may 
either help or hinder efforts to promote peace agreements and 
reconciliation.
109
 In sum, all of the potential functions and dysfunctions are 
relevant to the study of media coverage and intervention in conflict resolution. 
IV.  A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 
Figure 3 describes the proposed three-dimensional framework for analysis 
and practice.  It combines and integrates the various components discussed in 
the previous sections.  The components were adopted from different yet 
relevant fields of science: international relations, conflict studies, 
communication, and journalism.  The framework’s core is based on a 
modified life-cycle theory of conflicts and the functional approach to 
communication.  The framework demonstrates how research and practice can 
be organized to explore positive and negative contributions of the media 
through the two types and four phases of conflict, the two types and five 
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levels of media, and the five media functions and dysfunctions. 
 
Figure 3: Media and Conflict Resolution: A Framework for Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The framework is flexible and allows for partial or selective applications.  
Researchers do not necessarily need to apply the whole framework to all the 
conflict phases.  They may choose to investigate all five media functions in 
one phase or one function, such as news across all four conflict phases, or 
they can focus on one media function in one conflict phase, such as 
interpretation in reconciliation.  Scholars may also apply the framework to 
each of the five levels of media: local, national, regional, international, and 
global, or to a particular medium: newspaper, television, radio, or the Internet, 
within each category.  The framework could be especially useful for case 
studies of different kinds. 
Studies included in this issue could be classified according to the typology 
described in Figure 3.  For example, the conflict between the Dutch-speaking 
Flemish and the French-speaking Walloons is an internal dispute in Belgium.  
The Euwema and Verbeke study explores and compares the news functions 
and dysfunctions of the traditional regional media in the management 
(escalation) and resolution (de-escalation) phases of conflict.
110
  For example, 
the authors noted the failed attempts by the major daily newspapers in both 
regions, Le Soir and De Standaard, to inspire dialogue and understanding 
through mutual exchanges of journalists.
111
  The dysfunction occurred because 
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the journalists working and reporting from each other’s regions could not free 
themselves from their ethnic biases.  
The conflict in Iraq went through two stages; the first was interstate HIC 
and the second was internal LIC.  The short full-scale war the U.S.-led 
coalition conducted in 2003 to remove the regime of Saddam Hussein was 
HIC, while the ensuing, protracted civil war and the attacks on the coalition’s 
occupying forces represented LIC.  The McLeod article examines the 
mobilization dysfunction of the traditional national media (the television all-
news networks Fox News and CNN-US) in the prevention and management 
phases of conflict.
112
  The study argues that coverage of the Iraq conflict by 
the two networks, and perhaps by the entire American media, was 
dysfunctional because it failed to investigate and challenge the U.S. 
government’s assertions about key elements in the conflict, such as the 
existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and the links between 
Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda.  
The conflict in the Balkans in the 1990s was internal and produced waves 
of both HIC and LIC.  The Malley contribution offers a personal perspective 
both on contemporaneous and historical events.
113
  She compares coverage by 
the local and international media and the traditional and new media in the 
management and resolution phases of conflict.  Malley argues that the 
international media and the new media offered a more neutral and balanced 
reporting than the local media.  She implies that had the combatants been 
exposed to coverage of the first two media types, they would have perceived 
the events in a different and more useful way for conflict resolution. 
There is a fierce debate about the nature of the conflict over Tibet.  From 
the Chinese perspective, it is an internal dispute.  From the perspective of the 
Tibetans, their spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, and many states, it is an 
international dispute.  Lee’s study compares coverage of the Tibet conflict in 
the international (Western) traditional media and the national traditional 
Chinese media in the management phase of conflict.
114
  He suggests that there 
are more similarities than differences in the coverage of the two media 
systems. 
Violence erupting after elections, primarily in developing countries such 
as Iran, Kenya, Sri Lanka, and Zimbabwe, represents an internal LIC.  The 
Meadow study explores coverage of election violence by the national media 
 
(2005). 
112. Douglas M. McLeod, Derelict of Duty: The American News Media, Terrorism, and the 
War in Iraq, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 113 (2009). 
113. Malley, supra note 4. 
114. Andrew Wei-Min Lee, Tibet and the Media: Perspectives from Beijing, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 
209 (2009). 
2009] MEDIA & CONFLICT RESOLUTION FRAMEWORK 109 
in the election states.
115
  By definition, violence appears in the management 
phase of conflict.  The study presents the topic and a series of issues for future 
research.   
Peru suffered from a twenty-year internal armed conflict that began in the 
1980s.  The violence was clearly typical of LIC.  The Laplante and Phenicie 
study explores the Peruvian national media’s role during the reconciliation 
phase.  In this case, reconciliation was designed to prevent any recurrence of 
violence and abuses of power.
116
  The authors conclude that the media role in 
this particular case was mostly dysfunctional.  Figure 3 shows that most 
studies in this issue focus on news, interpretation, and mobilization, and that 
the results have been mostly dysfunctional.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
Most contemporary conflicts occur at the interstate or global level, and 
this pattern is likely to persist in decades to come.  The great majority of 
conflicts are of the LIC version, and this pattern is likely to persist in the near 
future.  The sources of contemporary conflicts include strong cultural and 
religious elements, and, therefore, it is difficult to resolve them.  This work 
argues that evolutions in communication technologies have significantly 
altered the media’s role in conflict resolution and reconciliation.  Global and 
regional news networks and the Internet allow new actors, primarily 
non-governmental organizations and individuals, to actively participate in 
conflict resolution.  New technology has challenged states, but at the same 
time provides states with new tools to accomplish their goals.  The media’s 
role is especially enhanced by the Internet, cell phones, and online social 
networks, and is especially relevant to LIC at the local or global level, where 
the expected results are perceptual and the main strategy is using violence to 
maximize sympathetic and supportive media coverage. 
This Article concludes that despite the critical, growing importance of the 
media to conflict resolution and reconciliation, scholars and practitioners have 
not yet adequately addressed the media’s role in these areas.  Particularly 
lacking is extensive research on the roles and effects of new media and global 
news networks.  The main reasons for the weaknesses are difficulties and 
deficiencies inherent in multidisciplinary research and the lack of suitable 
tools for analysis.  This work attempts to fill the gap with a new framework 
for analysis based on an innovative integration of theories and models from 
several scholarly fields.  Multidisciplinary research is the only effective way 
to understand the actual and potential positive and negative contributions of 
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the media to conflict resolution and reconciliation. 
The media can both help and hinder conflict resolution, and it is important 
to uncover the conditions determining the outcome.  If these conditions are 
exposed, it would be easier to maximize the media’s positive contributions 
and minimize negative contributions.  The peace journalism approach has 
adopted a highly simplistic and probably unrealistic approach to the media’s 
effects.  Systematic application of the framework proposed in this Article to 
case studies at different levels may promote badly needed knowledge and 
understanding of the various ways the media influence the beginning, 
evolution, and termination of existing and future international conflicts. 
The proposed framework is very comprehensive and requires prioritizing 
of research projects.  Immediate attention should be given to the highly 
neglected areas.  Thus, the first priority should be to investigate functions and 
dysfunctions of the local media because they directly affect people engaged in 
conflict and conflict resolution.  The next priority should be to focus on the 
reconciliation phase.  This stage is crucial because successful reconciliation is 
the best guarantee against the resurrection and reemergence of conflict and 
violence.  The third priority should be to focus on the roles and functions of 
the new media.  This effort is especially challenging because of the constant 
and rapid developments in communication technology.  Research in this field 
must resemble research in computer science.  It has to be fast, dynamic, and 
highly sensitive lest published research results become obsolete.  The fourth 
priority should be given to LIC.  Existing research tends to concentrate on 
HIC.  Although HIC is more attractive to scholars because it is more dramatic 
and spectacular, most existing and future conflicts are or will be LIC. 
Given the lack of cooperation between scholars in the different relevant 
fields and between scholars and practitioners, and given the multitude of 
divergent concepts and approaches to media roles, it is crucial to integrate and 
apply theories and models from both communication and conflict studies.  It 
is also useful to integrate the theories and the models into comprehensive 
multidisciplinary frameworks for analysis.  This is the most promising way to 
move forward.  The framework presented here could be a first step toward a 
new, integrated, multidimensional, and multidisciplinary research effort. 
 
